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 1 
Introduction and Overview 
 
Since the turn of the 21st century, China and its seemingly unhaltable progress have 
been at the forefront of media coverage in the United States.  Before its slew of reforms 
began in the late 1970s, China’s economy was dictated by policies that rendered it 
inefficient, stagnant, and poor.  By quickly identifying the socialist economic system that 
stymied its growth, China changed course in 1979 and opened itself to foreign trade and 
instituted free-market reforms.  Since then, China has been one of the world’s fastest 
growing economies with an average forty-year GDP growth of an astonishing 9.5%.1  
Emboldened by his country’s economic success, President Xi Jinping, who came to power 
in late 2012,  veered away from his predecessors’ risk-minimization policies in favor of 
more assertive geopolitical behavior designed to protect the country’s core interests in 
sovereignty and territorial control.  These new geopolitical moves present themselves in 
many ways: attempts to unify Taiwan, maritime disputes, quelling unrest along ethnic 
borders of Tibet and Xinjiang Province, and addressing calls for democracy in Hong Kong.  
Perhaps most significantly, Xi Jinping has taken a more aggressive stance towards 
challenging U.S. presence in East Asia, in the apparent belief that a U.S. weakened by more 
than a decade of wars in the Middle East and South Asia, the effects of the Great Recession, 
and escalating political dysfunction would not be able to push back against China.  As 120 
countries’ main trading partner and the largest economy in terms of purchasing power 
parity, China can afford to take bigger risks as more countries become reliant on its 
 
1 “China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States.” 
Congressional Research Service, June 25, 2019. 
 2 
manufacturing and exports, and cannot risk losing such a big player in their individual 
economies.2  The time since Xi’s coming to power, in particular, has proven especially eye-
opening for the United States and its allies across the globe.  In 2014, China took its most 
noticeable step in challenging U.S. authority by building – and then militarizing --seven 
artificial islands in the South China Sea, directly challenging American security interests 
in East Asia.  China’s aggressiveness signals its intent to control the region and contest the 
United States’ long-standing hegemony.  As the only power capable of pushing back 
against China’s rapid ascension, the United States finds itself in a precarious position with 
its future inexorably linked to China’s.  Most recently, the South China Sea dilemma 
challenged Obama and Trump’s foreign policy and national security competence that saw 
each embark on their own unique, vastly different approaches to quelling Chinese 
advancement.3 
 
The South China Sea Dispute and Chinese Interests 
 
 Located between six Southeast Asian countries4, the South China Sea is one of 
today’s most contentious regions, land or sea.  Due to its rich resource reserves, large 
fisheries, and important international shipping lanes, China’s increasing boldness in the 
South China Sea is reason for concern.5  To understand the recent escalation of the conflict, 
it is important to understand the claim to the territory from China’s perspective and its 
interests in the region.  Presently, China bases its claim on a statement issued by Chinese 
 
2 Lawrence, Susan. “China, U.S. Leadership, and Geopolitical Challenges in Asia,” December 22, 
2014, 3. 
3 Council on Foreign Relations. “Timeline: U.S. Relations With China 1949–2020.” 
4 Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam 
5 “The South China Sea in Strategic Terms | Wilson Center.” 
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premier Zhou Enlai in 1951 that proclaimed rights to the South China Sea and its islands.  
Since then, the Chinese government has issued several statements with similar language 
that stress China’s “indisputable sovereignty” over the islands and its waters.6  To illustrate 
its alleged domain, China continues to use the “nine-dash line” (jiǔduànxiàn; 九段线) 
initially drawn on an official Republic of China map in 1947 and has continued to appear 
on People’s Republic of China maps ever since.  For reasons still unknown, but likely to 
create strategic uncertainty, neither institution has ever officially defined the “nine-dash 
line” for the rest of the world, and rarely is the term used in government documents.  While 
the five neighboring countries also lay claims to areas of the South China Sea, China’s 
“nine-dash line” encompasses nearly eighty percent of the territory with complete disregard 
for the sovereignty of its neighbors.  With regards to sovereignty and the loose claims to 
different parts of the sea, there is existing legal basis intended to cover these concerns.  
According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), each 
country has an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) that extends two hundred nautical miles off 
its coasts, within which that country wholly reserves the right to conduct affairs.  However, 
UNCLOS goes on to prohibit a country from restricting access to the waters for ships to 
sail within the EEZ under freedom of navigation.7  This small yet particularly vague clause 
is the path along which China is pushing the limits of regional order.  Under the guise of 
freedom of navigation, China is sailing through the EEZs of other countries and using its 
superior military vessels to block them from gaining full access to their respective EEZs.  
 
6 Fravel, Taylor. “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 33, 
no. 3 (2011): 292–319. 
7 United Nations, “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” December 10, 1982.  
 4 
From harassing civilian fishermen to brushing up against foreign naval vessels, China’s 
actions expectedly raised tensions to an all-time high. 
 China’s interest in the South China Sea can be understood along three categories: 
economic, military, and national security.  Economically, full control of the South China 
Sea would allow China sole access to roughly 105 billion barrels of oil and natural gas.8  
Furthermore, nearly eighty percent of China’s oil imports arrive through those waters in 
addition to about one-third of all global trade flowing between Europe and the Americas.9  
Furthermore, as the world’s largest energy consumer, projected at twenty-two percent of 
the world energy consumption by 2040, China is looking for any new resources it can get 
its hands on.10  With regards to its military, an expansion into the South China Sea would 
allow China to control access to Asia and further thwart U.S. military encroachment, while 
also patrolling the shipping lines running through the area.11.  By building up military bases 
on the region’s islands, China is accomplishing its strategic and tactical objectives.  
Strategically, Beijing wants to undermine American credibility because if the United States 
is unable to punish China then other countries will begin doubting U.S. resolve.  Tactically, 
these islands are useless against an American military that could destroy them in seconds, 
but they are potent against the smaller nations that do not have the military strength to 
counter China.  Military bases will also allow China to quickly mobilize troops while 
jointly giving it rapid-strike capabilities with missiles and other weaponry in the event of 
a need for reactionary or preemptive attacks.  Military bases on these islands will also act 
 
8 Fravel, Taylor. “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 33, 
no. 3 (2011): 292–319. 
9 Pham, Peter. “Why Is Tension Rising In The South China Sea?” Forbes.  
10 BP Energy Outlook, China – 2019 
11 América Latina en movimiento. “South China Sea, the Geopolitical Pivot to Control Asia.”  
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as resupply and refueling points for Chinese military ships and aircraft that otherwise 
would not have the range to operate within the entirety of the South China Sea.  Moreover, 
the installation of reconnaissance equipment on the islands, paired with various aircraft, 
will give China surveillance capabilities over all its neighboring countries.12   From a 
national security perspective, surveillance of all possible threats is of utmost priority.  
Additionally, as a country that has seen many attacks arrive from the sea throughout its 
history, China’s interest in controlling the South China Sea becomes increasingly clear.  
With land-based invasions unlikely thanks to natural geological borders to the South and 
the East, and ally Russia to the North, gaining control of the surrounding seas is the only 
factor separating China from rivals Japan and the United States.13 
 
Great Power Competition Theory 
 
“Great power competition […] is now the primary focus of US national security” 
-Jim Mattis, U.S. Secretary of Defense 
 
Perhaps familiar to some, the idea of “great power competition” has been thrown 
around the realm of geopolitics for centuries.  Since the Napoleonic Wars, great powers 
have maneuvered for control of the entire world order, with several instances, such as 
World War II, tipping over into full-scale combat.14  While the significance of great power 
competition is clear, the explanation of the driving force of this phenomenon is three-
 
12 “What China’s ‘Militarization’ of the South China Sea Would Actually Look Like.” Accessed 
February 17, 2020. 
13 Rudra, Eshita. “China’s Strategic Interests in the South China Sea: Power and Resources.” 
Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India 13, no. 1 (May 11, 
2017): 102–4. 
14 Staley, Oliver. “The US Is Talking about ‘Great Power Competition.’ What Does That Mean?” 
Quartz. 
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pronged.  First, power transition theory has revealed in the past that an overtaking among 
great powers corresponds with major wars.  While this theory postulates that if China were 
to become the leading power without significant demands asked of the international system, 
then war will be averted; this reality is likely not the case.15  By looking through history, 
power transition theory has unveiled that “war is most likely and of greatest magnitude 
when a dissatisfied challenger and a dominant power enter into approximate power 
parity”.16  This concept of power parity helps to unpack the second prong of great power 
competition: balance of power theory.  As a state continues to ascend, it will naturally leave 
others in its wake.  As the growing state becomes stronger, the ‘declining’ states are 
inclined to react because they anticipate a future where the now more powerful state will 
wage war with superior capabilities or coerce them into concessions that compromise their 
security.17  It should also be noted that a sub-category of the balance of power within the 
international system reveals itself in the form of a balance of resources.  When a state 
aggrandizes its power, it requires more resources to function effectively, leaving it no 
choice but to upset the present distribution of resources among states. 18   When this 
balancing unravels, a larger state will react in such a way to expand its dominion – “the 
self-sustaining dynamic system” corrects itself.19  Consequently, according to esteemed 
 
15 Lemke, Douglas, and Ronald L Tammen. “Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China.” 
International Interactions 29, no. 4 (October 18, 2010): 269–71. 
16 Lebow, Richard Ned, and Benjamin Valentino. “Lost in Transition: A Critical Analysis of 
Power Transition Theory.” International Relations 23, no. 3 (September 1, 2009): 389–410. 
17 Shifrinson, Joshua. “The Rise of China, Balance of Power Theory and US National Security: 
Reasons for Optimism?” Journal of Strategic Studies 43, no. 2 (February 23, 2020): 175–216. 
18 Niou, Emerson M.S., and Peter C. Ordeshook. “A Theory of the Balance of Power in 
International Systems.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 30, no. 4 (December 1, 1986): 685–715.  
19 Valki, Laszlo. “On the Balance of Power Theory.” Annales Universitatis Scientiarum 
Budapestinensis de Rolando Eotvos Nominatae: Sectio Iuridica 25 (1983): 227–44. 
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scholar Hans Morgenthau, a state that chooses to undo the balance of the system must either 
“conquer the world, or perish”.20  Lastly, an increase in great power competition can be 
explained through the security dilemma created by rival powers.  This theory of war and 
peace via interactions among states is used to explain most major events in the 
contemporary era.  The most compelling catalyst of a security dilemma is the “universal 
sin of humanity” – fear; fear of actions taken by a rising state causes another state to feel 
insecure and triggers an expansion of power, typically in the form of military and defense 
buildup.21  The primary source of this fear is a state’s uncertainty and anxiety about the 
motives and intentions of its rivals.  Due to the vicious cycle of constantly accumulating 
power, states experiencing a security dilemma often lead to tragic consequences such as 
threats of war, or war itself.22   
 
U.S Interest in the SCS 
 
 The United States’ interests in the South China Sea are three-fold: economic, 
political, and military.  Following World War II, the United States has been on a continuing 
mission to promote a liberal rules-based global order to maximize economic growth and 
prosperity without the threat of war.  With so much of the world’s trade passing through 
the South China Sea, a hostile power controlling these waters would pose a serious threat 
to U.S. economic security and its position as the international hegemon and the guarantor 
of peace in East Asia.  With the United States’ power “predicated on the uninterrupted flow 
 
20 Ibid, 231. 
21 Tang, Shiping. “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis.” Security Studies 18, no. 3 
(September 18, 2009): 587–623. 
22 Ibid, 594. 
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of goods internationally,” it is easy to see why the South China Sea is becoming such a 
flashpoint in the greater Sino-U.S. competition.23  Strategically, the United States has three 
treaty allies (Japan, South Korea, the Philippines) in the region in addition to a handful of 
current, emerging, or potential partner countries.  As China continues to acquire power and 
flex its muscle, the United States, both out of its self-interest and commitments to its allies, 
has no choice but to stand firm in its security commitments.  Should the United States fail 
to honor its commitment to its allies and smaller nations, there is a good chance that these 
countries will gravitate towards China.24  Lastly, from a military perspective, the United 
States must prevent the bilateral balance of maritime power from developing 
disproportionately in favor of China. 
 Since 2014, China has threatened U.S. interests with brazen combative tactics.  
Ranging from illegal construction of military island-bases to haphazard claims to regions 
outside of countries’ Exclusive Economic Zones, China is intent on not allowing the United 
States on gaining strong footholds in the region.  China’s strategy also includes overt 
intimidation of neighboring countries and the harassment of both government and civilian 
vessels sailing through the South China Sea.25  
 
 
 
 
23 Center, Jewish Policy. “The South China Sea: Flashpoints for U.S. Interests.” Jewish Policy 
Center (blog), January 22, 2018.  
24 O’Rourke, Ronald. “U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: 
Background and Issues for Congress,” n.d., 105. 
25 Mackubin Thomas Owens, Bradley Bowman. “Dangerous Waters: Responding to China’s 
Maritime Provocations in the South China Sea.” Text. The National Interest. The Center for the 
National Interest, December 20, 2019. 
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President Obama’s Foreign Policy  
 
President Obama’s national security legacy will be marked as one of caution and 
patience – characterizations that proved to be both detrimental and beneficial to the goals 
of the United States.  He greatly stressed taking action alongside the United States’ allies 
as a sort of coalition and encouraged the country to “lead from behind”.26  He often traveled 
to foreign countries to meet with their leaders to open discussions about ongoing issues 
around the world.  Despite his best intentions at peaceful resolutions, he, for the most part, 
fell short of many of his aspirations and expectations.  Obama’s approach to national 
security may be best described within the post-partisan leadership framework that saw him 
attempt to bring together Americans on both sides of the aisle.  Concerning China 
specifically, Obama stressed a rebalancing in the region that would see the United States 
“pivot” to the Asia-Pacific.27  While the shift to the region may not have been as intense as 
its name suggests, it was a calculated move that served to remind China that the United 
States was keeping tabs on developments in the area with little provocation.  Obama’s 
overall approach to China, and more specifically the South China Sea, is one of distant 
monitoring, collaboration with allies, and reiterating to Beijing the potential proportionate 
punishments for its increasing assertiveness; very diplomatic in nature.  Despite the lengths 
Obama went to ensure peaceful relations, many critics believe that his reluctance to engage 
 
26 Tierney, Dominic. “Obama and Trump: Foreign Policy Opposites or Twins? - Foreign Policy 
Research Institute.” Foreign Policy Research Institute, December 13, 2019. 
27 O’Hanlon, Michael E. “Obama the Carpenter: The President’s National Security Legacy.” 
Brookings (blog), May 21, 2015. 
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militarily in other regions of the world has emboldened direct rivals of the United States, 
such as Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin.28 
 
President Trump’s Foreign Policy 
 
 Having been unimpressed with the Obama Administration’s handling of national 
security issues, Trump essentially reversed course on much of the strategies Obama set out 
on; though not to the complete failure that many expected.  Painting himself in the light as 
a sort of Obama alter ego, Trump champions the idea of a strong United States.  On multiple 
occasions, he has shown disdain to countries within the allied coalition that Obama helped 
build and he has pursued a relatively abrasive foreign policy strategy that has resulted in 
the erosion of some security alliances, all in the hopes of forging a stronger United States 
capable of tackling concerns singlehandedly.29  Most notably to this point, Trump has 
withdrawn from more treaties and organizations than all the post-Cold War U.S. presidents 
combined.30  His foreign policy decisions at times appear to be dictated by his personality, 
leading to a chiefly incoherent agenda.  However, out of all the apparent chaos, emerges 
foreign policy that is at times oddly effective.  When looking at China, Trump displays a 
vehement desire to stymie its power projection.  In general, he believes that the most 
promising pathway to peace is the display of the United States’ might.  He promotes a 
much-needed toughening of policy towards China that the country lacked in yesteryears.  
 
28 Horsley, Scott. “Patient Diplomacy And A Reluctance To Act: Obama’s Mark On Foreign 
Policy.” NPR, September 20, 2016. 
29 Metz, Steven. “The Flaws in Trump’s Strategic Approach to U.S. National Security.” World 
Politics Review, July 5, 2019. 
30 Tierney, Dominic. “Obama and Trump: Foreign Policy Opposites or Twins? - Foreign Policy 
Research Institute.” Foreign Policy Research Institute, December 13, 2019. 
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From harsh sanctions and increased naval activity in the South China Sea, Trump appears 
ready to prevent China from gaining any sort of advantage over the United States on his 
watch.31  The “America first” slogan Trump campaigned with on his journey to the Oval 
Office rings true. 
 
China’s Reaction 
 
 In response to the United States’ constant reinforcement of freedom of navigation, 
China has continued to express “strong dissatisfaction” and “resolute opposition,” 
according to Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang.32  China believes that the United 
States’ actions infringe upon Chinese sovereignty and disrupt the stability of the seas, and 
urges the United States to cease all of its seemingly provocative actions.  In 2014, Xi 
signaled his dissatisfaction by proposing an Asian Security Concept stressing that “it is for 
the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia, and uphold the 
security of Asia”.33  In the same year, a Chinese Vice-Foreign Ministry publicly criticized 
the United States’ treaty allies in Asia, saying that “strengthening bilateral alliances would 
easily worsen divisions and confrontations in the region”.34  Further down the line, Xi 
reinforced his ideology at a 2017 United Nations speech in Geneva where he called for a 
“community of shared order” with “no interference in countries’ internal affairs” while 
 
31 Blackwill, Robert. “Trump’s Foreign Policies Are Better Than They Seem.” Council on 
Foreign Relations, no. 84 (April 2019). 
32 Welle (www.dw.com), Deutsche. “China Warns US after Warships Sail in Disputed South 
China Sea | DW | 06.05.2019.” DW.COM. Accessed April 5, 2020. 
33 Lawrence, Susan. “China, U.S. Leadership, and Geopolitical Challenges in Asia,” December 
22, 2014, 3. 
34 Ibid, 2. 
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having the “right to independently choose their social system and development path”.35  
These comments were undoubtedly calling to question the United States’ democracy 
promotion across the globe.  Furthermore, using language mirroring that of Obama’s 
speech in Vietnam, almost as if to mock the United States, Xi proclaimed that “big 
countries should treat smaller ones as equals and not […] impose their will on others”.36  
Scattered intermittently throughout these years, China has accompanied its diplomatic 
discussions and speeches with physical actions in the South China Sea.  In response to the 
United States’ continuing unwillingness to back down, China deployed the DF-26 missile 
system capable of destroying hefty naval vessels with both conventional and nuclear 
warheads.  This deployment falls in line with the overall theme of China’s response as 
significant military buildup in line with the A2/D2 strategy – anti-access/area denial – that 
deters other countries from entering the region.37  It seems as though with every instance 
of U.S. ships passing through the South China Sea, Beijing will send more of its ships and 
planes to the pseudo-bases on contested islands.  Interestingly, Xi Jinping conducted 
China’s largest-ever naval parade near the islands as a show of his commitment to claiming 
the territory.  At a more micro level, China has also been known to approach foreign vessels 
to force them to leave the area.  On one occasion, the Chinese destroyer, Lanzhou, came 
within 40 meters of the USS Decatur, with the U.S. Navy describing the encounter as “a 
series of increasingly aggressive maneuvers accompanied by warnings for Decatur to 
 
35 Lawrence, Susan V, Caitlin Campbell, Rachel F Fefer, Jane A Leggett, Thomas Lum, Michael 
F Martin, and Andres B Schwarzenberg. “U.S.-China Relations,” September 3, 2019, 61. 
36 Lawrence, Susan V, Caitlin Campbell, Rachel F Fefer, Jane A Leggett, Thomas Lum, Michael 
F Martin, and Andres B Schwarzenberg. “U.S.-China Relations,” September 3, 2019, 61. 
37 Lawrence, Susan. “China, U.S. Leadership, and Geopolitical Challenges in Asia,” December 
22, 2014, 3. 
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depart the area”.38  These actions are a significant step beyond simply verbal warnings and 
teeter on recklessness that could lead to unfortunate conflicts.  
 
Great Power Competition in the South China Sea 
 
With a political system that is the antithesis to most other countries, peaceful 
acceptance of China as the global hegemon is difficult to imagine.  Competition between 
major international actors is fundamentally different from rivalries between smaller actors 
or between smaller actors and major actors.  Since major actors, like the United States and 
China, have such huge scopes of global influence, whoever can emerge as the most 
influential state will likely be able to shape the international system in their image; actions 
of minor powers will be inherently tied to them.  Additionally, the theory of great power 
competition holds that major powers are both more conflict-prone than other actors and 
more escalatory than asymmetric crises, thus providing a possible explanation for the 
recent intensification of clashes in the South China Sea.39  Unlike a clash between a minor 
actor and a major actor, there is no scenario where two major actors can backdown without 
suffering significant reputational costs.  This theorization paints a grim outlook on the crisis 
at hand.  From a Western point of view, the championing of a liberal international order 
leads the world to be a safer and less hostile place.  However, China has long realized that 
this liberal system has always, and continues to, pose an existential threat to its regimes.40  
There are simply too many aspects of liberal regimes that can undermine China’s 
 
38 CNN, Brad Lendon. “China’s Reaction to US Navy Operation: We Have Missiles.” CNN. 
39 Hensel, Paul, and Thomas Sowers. “Territorial Claims, Major Power Competition, and the 
Origins of Enduring Rivalry.” Department of Political Science, September 1998. 
40 Wright, Thomas. “The Return to Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable.” Brookings (blog), 
September 12, 2018.  
 14 
authoritarian rule; Beijing decided to push back.  In response to the pushback, it should 
come as no surprise that both Obama and Trump, regardless of partisanship, were unwilling 
to accommodate an emerging China.  With abhorrence and skepticism tracing back to the 
Cold War, there seems to be no future in sight for the two countries’ ideologies to coexist. 
 
Focus of Thesis  
 
 The purpose of this thesis is to examine the strategies undertaken by the Obama 
administration and the Trump administration in the face of China’s expansion as a whole, 
and then specifically related to the South China Sea.  The thesis also examines Xi Jinping’s 
rise to power and how his foreign policy has challenged both American presidents’ 
approaches.  Using a wide range of government documents, media reports, and past 
academic research, this qualitative study concludes with assessing the effectiveness of the 
three presidents’ strategies and provides an outlook for what the future of the South China 
Sea conflict and greater Sino-U.S. relations will look like. 
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The Obama Administration and the South China Sea 
 
“America’s first Pacific President” 
-President Barack Obama, Tokyo, November 2009 
 
The Return to Asia 
 
 When President Obama first assumed his role in the Oval Office, he was determined 
to distinguish his foreign policy from that of his predecessor, President George W. Bush.  
While President Bush’s foreign policy is characterized as unilateral and Middle East-
centric, Obama saw the Asia-Pacific as the perfect intersection of his two objectives of 
promoting multilateralism and shifting foreign policy attention.41  Riding the coattails of 
two major decisions in the killing of Osama Bin Laden and ending U.S. involvement in the 
Iraq War, Obama needed a comparably grandiose statement for his second term to address 
China’s growing influence in Asia that would divert the nation’s attention away from 
Bush’s waning War on Terror.  To accomplish this goal, the Obama Administration 
outlined a strategic “pivot to Asia” that called for a considerable reorienting of foreign 
policy resources to restore U.S. leadership in the region.42  While a concentration on Asia 
is not necessarily new given the United States’ constant presence since World War II, the 
focus of U.S. presence has been shifted towards the security sphere.  From a realist 
perspective, the refocus on Asia makes perfect sense and is fueled by the existence of six 
of the world’s ten largest armies housed in the region, three of whom possess nuclear 
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weapons.43  While the ‘pivot’ to Asia is not so much a pivot as it is a rebalancing of 
attention, Obama’s strategies that make up the framework of this movement emphasized 
multilateralism to promote an order based in mutual security alliances, not one where “big 
nations bully the small.”44  Obama’s vision thus became not a question of whether the 
United States should or should not lead, but how it should lead. 
 
Together We Can – Multilateralism  
 
In a 2011 speech to the Australian Parliament, President Obama made his vision 
known: 
“We (the US) stand for an international order in which the rights and 
responsibilities of all nations and all people are upheld. Where international 
law and norms are enforced. Where commerce and freedom of navigation 
are not impeded. Where emerging powers contribute to regional security, 
and where disagreements are resolved peacefully”.45 
 
The message to the world was clear – the United States was not looking for material gains 
or profits.   Its goal is to uphold the norm of global peace and cooperation through 
established multilateral institutions.  To attain this vision of the future, the Obama 
Administration’s most notable policy decision was its emphasis on cooperative 
engagement and “burden sharing”.46  He recognized that the United States did not have 
unlimited resources and power, so it should not be expected to dictate the outcome of events 
around the world.  This step back from the unilateral strategies of his predecessor revealed 
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Obama’s commitment to “hegemonic restraint” and his belief that the American image 
could be restored through a strong network of allies and partnerships.47  In practice, this 
‘burden sharing’ came to fruition in Obama’s reinforcement of U.S. participation in Asia’s 
multilateral institutions such as the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 
Regional Forum, a security dialogue between twenty-seven countries and the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP), an enormous proposed trade agreement.  Active and diligent 
participation in these institutions was viewed with utmost priority by the Obama 
Administration because it allowed the United States to maintain an influential voice in 
discussions regarding the security and economy of the region.  Where once ASEAN was 
dismissed as a simple formality, the Obama Administration spurred attendees to discuss 
relevant security issues.  
 
ASEAN and U.S. Relations with Smaller Southeast Asian Nations 
 
 The creation of ASEAN offers a unique opportunity for the smaller countries of 
Asia to build a sense of identity and community.  With China growing at an incredible rate, 
the ten ASEAN nations cultivated a sense of security amongst themselves with China as a 
common worry.  ASEAN creates a network of mutual trust amongst its members – trust 
being a tough commodity to come by with an ever-unpredictable Beijing looming overhead.  
In his foreign policy, Obama discovered the value of this trust network and the possible 
dividends of the United States’ incorporation into that network.  At its core, ASEAN has 
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always been a pro-U.S. institution; ASEAN leaders convene and speak in English, member 
states adopted free-market economies, and states welcome American investments with 
open arms.  Furthermore, following a terrible display of Chinese diplomacy in which 
Beijing blocked an ASEAN communiqué, Obama felt the benefits of his rapprochement to 
Asia as ASEAN members drifted away from China and closer to the United States.  In the 
security realm, the pursuit of ASEAN involvement allowed the United States to re-promote 
past talks between Southeast Asian nations and China regarding the South China Sea.  In 
2002, ASEAN members and China signed the “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in 
the South China Sea” (DOC) that was later bolstered in 2011 by the signing of the 
“Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC” – an agreement for all nations to respect 
the South China Sea status quo.48  With American support, ASEAN nations are more 
readily willing to make stances, albeit small, towards China in their efforts to reclaim 
territory.  The formalization of these codes dictating behavior is just one step in the right 
direction.  At the end of the day, ASEAN acts as a mechanism for balancing the powers in 
the region.  Extending outward to the ASEAN+3 and +6 talks, ASEAN can decide the 
circumstances under which a larger power may enter the discussions, making it necessary 
for them to work through ASEAN to further their interests.  Perhaps the criteria most 
relevant to the South China Sea is that all ASEAN convinced all Asia-Pacific powers to 
sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) that legally commits them to not use 
armed force in the region.  By working through ASEAN, Obama hoped that these powers 
could simultaneously strengthen their positions while also acting as each other’s checks 
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and balances.49  Obama’s working with small Southeast Asian countries makes clear how 
ASEAN can challenge China. 
 In a visit to Hanoi, President Obama vehemently backed Vietnam’s territorial 
claims in the South China Sea.  As if this support was not enough to alarm China, Obama 
also lifted a decades-long arms embargo.  With this embargo out of the picture, the United 
States is allowed to sell weapons to Vietnam, with Obama quickly taking the opportunity 
to promise “more access to security equipment” to improve its security, defend its 
territorial claims, and most importantly protect its sovereignty.50  With their Communist 
roots, Vietnam views China as its most valuable bilateral partner; however, China’s actions 
in the South China Sea have put a huge strain on their relationship that has seen Vietnam 
cozy up to the United States.  Agreeing to warm up to Vietnam is a calculated, strategic 
military play for the United States to regain formal naval access to part of the region as the 
U.S. Navy has not been allowed to enter since it used Vietnamese ports as bases during the 
Vietnam War.  Cam Ranh Bay, in particular, is Vietnam’s closest port to the South China 
Sea and is just one example of a port without U.S. Naval access for decades.51  To formalize 
their relationship, the United States and Vietnam signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
on Advancing Bilateral Defense Cooperation which included maritime security as the main 
focus.  This shift away from China by Vietnam is significant because it reveals that 
Vietnam’s wariness of China’s territorial expansion trumps their historical partnership.  As 
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a show of improved relations, the General Secretary of Vietnam’s Communist Party made 
the position’s first-ever visit to the United States in 2015. 
 Similarly, Obama looked to President Duterte of the Philippines to bolster 
resistance against China.  In 2014, the United States and the Philippines signed an 
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement that allows the United States to rotate troops 
throughout the island nation and build facilities on already existing Filipino bases. 52  
However, Obama lent a helping hand to the Philippines long before this agreement came 
to fruition.  In 2011, the United States sold a handful of considerably sized Coast Guard 
ships that were set to be decommissioned but were instead retrofitted by the Philippine 
Navy as part of President Aquino’s defense modernization movement.  Furthermore, 
Obama continued to ensure that annual Balikatan – meaning ‘shoulder-to-shoulder’ – 
military training exercises take place.53  In 2015, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter 
announced the Southeast Asia Maritime Initiative that pledged more exchange of military 
equipment, training, and intelligence to Southeast Asian nations, with the Philippines as a 
main beneficiary.  At the end of the day, the United States is bound by treaty to help the 
Philippines should its territory come under attack, but what that help will look like with 
regards to the South China Sea remains uncertain. 
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Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
 
The United States, and mainly Japan, continued to challenge China’s increasing 
boldness by reaffirming their propensity to display leadership through the creation of the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership – the biggest regional trade accord in history.  The United States’ 
main reasoning for joining the TPP is such that it does not become marginalized from the 
ever-shifting regional power dynamics in Asia.  Joining the TPP would also reassure 
American allies and partners that it can be a “multidimensional power” capable of 
delivering stability and security.54  In short, the TPP aims to reduce a slew of tariffs 
between countries in Southeast Asia and the Americas, while striving to uphold a global 
economic culture of high standards on labor, the environment, and intellectual property.55  
This trade agreement between twelve countries, and excluding China, set new terms for the 
$28 trillion in trade and investments flowing between the signatories.  Furthermore, it 
would put the United States in the driver’s seat for writing the rules of a group that 
represents 40 percent of the world’s trade.56  This cooperation naturally made China uneasy 
because it hinted at the possibility of future rules of the global economic system to be 
heavily influenced by U.S. ideals.  Moreover, smaller powers in the region will be reeled 
in closer to the United States and will begin to rely less on China.  The TPP posed a 
dilemma for China because joining the agreement would mean conceding to a western-
based standards system that would require China to significantly reassess and rework its 
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economic opening, economic regulation, and economic diplomacy. 57   Consequently, 
choosing to not participate in the TPP would see China lose an estimated $100 billion in 
exports.58  Additionally, joining the TPP would strip China of the competitive advantage it 
enjoys in its labor force by obligating Beijing to adhere to new labor laws.  Though framed 
as a harmless trade agreement, the ulterior motive of the TPP’s creation was clear.  As 
stated by Obama himself, “[the United States] can’t let countries like China write the rules 
of the global economy” when “95 percent of the [United States’] potential customers live 
outside [its] borders”.59  These statements add truth to the allegations that the United States 
was using the TPP as a means of challenging China.  From a competitive perspective, the 
TPP creates a pseudo-ultimatum that forces Asian countries to pick a side – China or the 
United States – in the event of a bilateral conflict between their two spheres of influence. 
 
Alliance Building 
 
U.S.-Japan 
 
 Shortly following Japan’s surrender in World War II, the United States conducted 
a military occupation to permanently stomp out fascism and ensure the future of Japan 
aligned with the United States’ trajectory.  For years, the United States worked tirelessly 
to win Japan as an ally because, as George Kennan stated, “Japan [was] the key to Asia, 
just as Germany was the key to Europe”.60  With help from the United States, Japan was 
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on track to emerge as the leading military-industrial power in East Asia.  Perhaps even 
more so than the United States, Japan feels the pressure of a rising China and recognizes 
the importance of maintaining strong security ties with the West.  To help alleviate the 
United States’ security burden, and to ensure its own protection, Japan entered into a 
“Special Measures Agreement” and pays Washington roughly $2 billion every year to 
cover some of the costs associated with stationing U.S. troops in Japan.  Additionally, 
Japan provides financial compensation to localities that host U.S. troops and also pays rent 
for the bases that are built.61  The most contemporary example of bilateral cooperation 
between the United States and Japan comes in the form of a Joint Statement for Defense 
Cooperation agreed upon at the conclusion of the 2013 2+2 meeting of U.S. Secretaries of 
State and Defense and Japan’s Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defense.  This Joint 
Statement reaffirmed the critical role of the alliance in maintaining balance and security in 
the region based on shared values of “democracy, the rule of law, free and open markets 
and respect for human rights”.62  Obama welcomed the idea of challenging China by 
exercising a “collective self-defense” of Japan and U.S. assets stationed there, while also 
committing to increasing defense spending allowing Japan to defend its “sovereign 
territory”.63  Concerning ongoing territory disputes with China, the U.S. and Japan together 
pushed Beijing to play a “responsible and constructive role” in the region’s stability, 
“adhere to international norms of behavior,” and increase “openness and transparency” 
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regarding its military modernization and investments.64  Additionally, the United States 
pledged a heightened defense position to Japan by increasing the frequency and scope of 
bilateral training such as missile defense and military simulations.  In 2014, Obama made 
clear to Beijing that he considered the Senkaku Islands (in the East China Sea) to be 
protected under the U.S.-Japan security treaty.  This statement saw Obama become the first 
sitting U.S. president to formally acknowledge the islands and set a precedent for the U.S. 
perspective of the contested islands in the South China Sea. 65   To strengthen this 
commitment, the United States and Japan reworked the language in their Alliance 
Coordination Mechanism (ACM) that saw a shift from substance-less generalizations to a 
more robust plan to manage future crises jointly without escalating to the use of military 
forces.66  The ACM acts as a U.S.-Japan governing body that can rapidly respond and adapt 
to any contingency using all relevant government agencies.  Like NATO, the ACM gives 
the U.S.-Japan alliance a formalized command structure that offers more stability while 
allowing for more flexibility; the ACM was previously only convenable in states of war.67  
This change puts forth a solution to handling events in “gray zone” scenarios.  
 
U.S.-Australia 
 
 Though not itself situated in the South China Sea, Australia is another example of 
a country in the Asia-Pacific with some muscle committed to helping the United States’ 
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causes.  Where once the relationship became stagnant, it surged back to life under the 
Obama Administration and was exemplified by Australia sending troops and equipment to 
the Middle East to assist the United States thwart the advancement of the Islamic State.    
Playing along the line of his recommitment to the region, Obama used the tensions in the 
South China Sea to station 2500 U.S. Marines in the coastal city of Darwin.  These troops, 
located a mere 500 miles from the southern tip of Indonesia, are set up to be able to respond 
to any conflict within the region at a moment’s notice.  This decision came as a response 
to increased military mobilization by China where they continued to develop new ballistic 
missile capabilities and hinted at deploying nuclear submarines into the Pacific Ocean.  
Their stationing was a symbolic move by Obama that would ensure “the security 
architecture for the region is updated for the 21st century” – a decision that shortly followed 
a 2010 Australia-United States Ministerial Consultation looking to explore “options for 
enhanced joint defense cooperation on Australian soil”. 68 , 69   The following 2015 
ministerial saw Australia back the United States’ discontentment of China’s land-grabs and 
called for all claimant states to cease construction and militarization.  Both nations jointly 
emphasized the importance of maintaining lawful use of the seas and skies, and were 
instrumental in coaxing ASEAN into forming their Code of Conduct in the South China 
Sea.70  The strengthening of the U.S.-Australia relationship under Obama served to remind 
the world that these two countries have stood side by side in conflicts throughout history 
and it paints a hopeful picture that they will do the same for future conflicts.  Should 
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conflict break out in the Indo-Pacific, Obama is certain that the United States’ “most 
stalwart ally (when it comes to troop deployment)” will step up in a big way.71  As the 
cornerstone of Anglo-Saxon culture in Asia, the United States and Australia’s alliance 
appears to be set in stone. 
 
U.S.-India 
 
 During his two terms in office, President Obama set new standards for U.S.-India 
relations.  Not only did he make two trips to India – a feat never done by any U.S. president 
– but he also hosted Indian leaders at the White House a record number of times; Prime 
Minister Singh thrice and Prime Minister Modi twice.72  Furthermore, Obama advocated 
for India’s inclusion in the United Nations Security Council, a recognition that not only 
acknowledged India’s path to attaining great power status but also acknowledged India as 
a top global player.73  Simply put, Obama was coming to terms with India’s rise in China’s 
shadow and was anticipating the best way to take advantage of its growing presence.  At 
the beginning of his first term, Obama used Secretary Clinton to establish a “high-level 
U.S. strategic dialogue” on capacity building and democratic institutions, two things that 
would be “hard to discuss with China,” the other major power in the region.74  On the 
security front, the Obama years saw the United States conduct more military training 
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exercises with India than with any other country in the world; nearly fifty per year.75  The 
two nations came together to produce a Joint Statement that expanded collaboration per the 
Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) intended to give India license-free access 
to a host of American defense technology.  Shortly thereafter, India signed a deal to 
purchase $1.1 billion of U.S. maritime patrol planes.  Together, the United States and India 
have committed to $11 billion worth of defense contracts since Obama came into office; a 
staggering increase of two thousand percent.76  As a show of support for Obama’s refocus 
to Asia, Prime Minister Modi embarked on a new diplomacy dubbed “Act East,” an effort 
to increase cooperation with other Southeast Asian countries as a contest to China’s 
growing influence.77  To thwart Chinese maritime advances, Prime Minister Modi funneled 
nearly $8 billion into a port project in Bangladesh that was previously funded by a Chinese 
engineering company.78  In the end, India’s growing influence in Asia is an appealing 
gateway through which the United States can reinstate itself as China’s bane. 
 As the three largest powers in the Asia-Pacific (excluding China), it makes sense 
that Obama looked to strengthen ties across all fronts with these nations.  To deter China 
from acting out of line in the South China Sea, the United States reaffirmed security 
commitments to all three nations.  Individually, none of the three nations possess enough 
military strength to keep China at bay, however, with the United States’ backing it seems 
possible to keep China at bay for the foreseeable future. 
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Obama in Troubled Waters 
 
 As a whole, President Obama’s approach to the South China Sea was very cautious.  
While he ordered several of Freedom of Navigation Operations, China decided to take 
advantage of Obama’s pacifist attitude and challenge the United States by ramping up its 
island-building.  To the dismay of many, Obama’s response consisted of very little physical 
rebuttals and instead centered on public statements urging Beijing to stop their actions.  
Even with all the talk about potential consequences if China keeps building, Obama never 
actually enforced anything.  However, everything changed after Obama hosted Xi at the 
White House and reportedly conveyed the gravity of the South China Sea situation.  While 
it is not known what exactly was said during their discussion, China quickly withdrew its 
ships from the Scarborough Shoal.   Many scholars believe that Obama finally took a red-
line stance and showed Xi that claiming that particular set of islands would result in 
military conflict with the United States.  In the days following that turning point meeting, 
the United States ramped up military flyovers in the region using planes traditionally used 
for combat, not surveillance.79 
 
Conclusion 
 
 President Obama’s Asia policy decisions can be best summarized as non-
inflammatory.  His administration openly welcomed China, albeit under the many 
aforementioned conditions.  His “pivot to Asia” and choice to work closely with the nations 
surrounding China is a calculated move meant to strengthen ties within the region without 
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setting off Beijing.  He realized that addressing China’s rise would not be possible without 
the support of these other nations, and even still may not be enough to stop Beijing.  Wary 
that his country’s actions will likely be interpreted by Beijing as attempts to contain China, 
Obama played off many of his strategic moves as byproducts of cooperation that were 
taking place before China’s expansion into the South China Sea began.  From joint military 
exercises to the exchange of equipment, the United States insisted that it was simply 
maintaining its long-standing defense agreements and treaties. 
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The Trump Administration and the South China Sea 
 
“China is neither an ally or a friend -- they want to beat us and own our country.” 
- President Donald Trump, Twitter, 2011 
 
 When stacking up Trump’s approach to the South China Sea with Obama’s, the 
difference is clear.  While Obama approached the region with a clearly laid out plan, 
Trump’s strategy was largely incoherent.  As a man committed to American nationalism 
and protectionism, it is unsurprising that Trump has backed away from multilateral 
institutions and has not put effort into strengthening relationships with key U.S. allies that 
Obama started on.  Despite dialing up bilateral confrontations with China on all fronts, his 
tactics addressing the economic and military issues have proven somewhat effective. While 
his seemingly erratic behavior unnerves U.S. allies and partners, there may be some 
‘method to the madness’ as Trump’s Asia policies have caused some noticeable headaches 
for Beijing. 
 
The Return from Asia 
 
 The tweet above, even so many years before he was elected to office, should have 
made clear Trump’s attitude towards China.  When President Trump ran for office in 2016, 
his constituencies and campaign slogans reverberated with chants of “America First” and 
“Make American Great Again”.  He envisioned a world in which he could protect the 
United States and its interests from outside actors looking to undermine its position as the 
world’s most powerful country.  From the get-go, Trump ditched Obama’s 
noninflammatory tone with repeated attacks and accusations of China’s wrongdoings.  
Upon taking office in early 2017, Trump set aside the United States’ relationships in favor 
of a confrontational approach to China while maintaining enough leeway for deal-making.  
 31 
In a show of defiance of the global status quo, Trump accepted a phone call from Taiwanese 
president Tsai Ing-wen; a clear questioning of the “One China” policy and favoring a 
regional policy less deferential to Beijing.80  In dealing with the South China Sea, Trump’s 
rhetoric and approach is the polar opposite of that of Obama.  Rather than promote 
multilateralism, Trump opted for a unilateral foreign policy stance reminiscent of the last 
Republican president, President George W. Bush.  His desire is for more countries to step 
up and share some of the burdens that the United States bears to maintain security in the 
region; Trump is tired of free riders.  In his eyes, past presidents, Obama in particular, were 
not nearly hard enough on China; a softness that only allowed for China to continue to 
grow without significant obstacles.  Trump’s appointment of General James “Mad Dog” 
Mattis as his Secretary of Defense all but signified his desire to impose American might 
on China.  Firmly believing in the United States as the world’s example of freedom and 
democracy, Trump adopted a foreign policy doctrine that framed the “geopolitical 
competition between free and repressive visions of world order,” with his greatest weapon 
being his notorious unpredictability and knack for building suspense in the face of 
negotiations.81 
 
The Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) 
 
 The Trump Administration’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy, at the surface, 
appears similar to Obama’s ‘pivot’ to Asia; however, it differs starkly by putting 
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competition with China front and center.  The main tenant of the FOIP was clear – provide 
Southeast Asia with a competitive alternative to Beijing’s ambitious Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI).  Trump’s pushback on the BRI is reminiscent of Cold War rhetoric in 
which he describes China as a “revisionist power” looking to unseat the United States as 
the global hegemon using approaches and tactics that come at the expense of the United 
States and other countries.82  In a speech given before visiting the region, Vice President 
Mike Pence pledged the United States’ “steadfast and enduring commitment” to the Indo-
Pacific and made clear to China and its neighboring countries that Southeast Asia should 
be a region where “sovereignty is respected, where commerce flows unhindered and where 
independent nations are masters of their own destinies”.83  Furthermore, in an apparent 
address to China specifically, he made clear that one of the three FOIP pillars was the 
security of freedom of navigation and overflight, and capped off his speech by asserting 
that “authoritarianism, aggression, [and empire] have no place in the Indo-Pacific”.84 
 
Defense Contestations under FOIP – Peace through Strength 
 
 To promote a free and open region, Trump brought the United States forward as 
the guarantor of peace in the region.  Though not a fan of multilateralism, Trump did see 
the benefits of providing Southeast Asian countries with the means necessary to promote 
regional freedom on their own accords.  In 2017, the United States sold $9.42 billion worth 
of arms and provided more than $500 million in security assistance to regional states – 
more than double the amount in 2016 under Obama.  These sales, however, were not 
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without their setbacks.  After agreeing to bolster the defenses of Southeast Asian nations, 
his encouraging them to act on their own led to many leaders scrambling to come up with 
home-grown solutions as a result of Trump’s non-committal attitude.85  In response to 
Chinese advances in the South China Sea, it is clear that Trump favors direct, unmistakable 
signals.  When reports came in of China deploying anti-ship missiles to its manmade 
islands, Trump promptly proceeded to rescind the PLA-Navy’s invite to the biennial Rim 
of the Pacific naval exercises in Hawaii.  Doubling down on its concerns, the United States 
directly called for China to remove those missiles at the U.S.-China Diplomatic and 
Security Dialogue.  Additionally, Trump is adamant about enforcing maritime and aviation 
laws and understandings, highlighted by twenty Freedom of Navigation Operations 
(FONOPs) since his inauguration, with Pence even using his own flight to Singapore to 
send the same message.86  Trump has given much more authority to the Pentagon to carry 
out these operations as a strategic move meant to add swiftness to decision-making from 
experts in the field.  The Trump administration also called for other nations, Japan in 
particular, to carry out their own FONOPS to curtail the growing Chinese fleets.  In terms 
of military buildup of his own, Trump planned to increase the number of ships in the Navy 
from 276 to 350 and upgrade all in-service ships’ equipment.  The new numbers behind 
Trump’s FONOPs mark a clear departure from Obama’s operations of the same nature.  By 
February 2019, Trump’s FONOPs amounted to more than twice as many as Obama 
conducted in his eight years.  Trump’s operations also bring U.S. navy vessels within just 
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twelve nautical miles of the islands.  For reference, a country has sovereignty rights over 
most affairs extending two hundred nautical miles from its shores, but other countries may 
still sail through those waters depending on their purpose and subject to the rule of 
international maritime law.  Twelve nautical miles, however, is as close as the U.S. can get 
to ‘Chinese’ islands before China has outright authority to take action against those ships; 
Trump is toeing the line.87 
 
Trade War et al. 
 
 President Trump’s skepticism of multilateralism as a solution to an assertive China 
is best exemplified by his decision to withdraw the United States from the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership.  A businessman by trade, Trump must have had strong concerns about the 
efficacy of this trade agreement in a region that accounts for sixty percent of U.S. exports.88  
He believed that the TPP would undermine American economic superiority by taking 
domestic jobs and moving them overseas.  As tensions in the South China Sea rose, one of 
Trump’s top economic advisors, Peter Navarro, pointed out trade as a likely medium for 
China to undermine U.S. security.  He expressed concerns that China was “weaponizing” 
its investments in the United States to “vacuum up U.S. industrial capabilities” with the 
goal of “turn[ing] its own technology against [it] in an effort to erase [U.S.] security 
advantage”.89  Such a strategy by China, combined with various other alleged economic 
malpractices, led Trump to use the economy as a means of forcing China to think twice 
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about its previously weakly contended advances in Southeast Asia.  In his second year in 
office, Trump imposed punitive tariffs on $250 billion of Chinese products while adding 
restrictions to Chinese investments and its purchases of U.S. technology.  This decoupling 
from China is an ambitious attempt to cut off China from the global supply chain by forcing 
Western companies to look at other Southeast Asian nations to relocate their overseas 
production, and ultimately crippling the Chinese economy.90  Without a strong economy, 
Trump argued, China will need to stop its militarization and island-building to shift its 
focus away from the South China Sea back to saving its economy.  In short, the trade war 
is meant to squeeze China to the point where they have no choice but to play by the rules 
written by the United States and western liberal order.  In addition to a trade war, the United 
States has embarked on less blatant economic endeavors.  In 2018, Congress passed the 
Better Use of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act that merged a handful of 
institutions to form a financial corporation capable of supporting projects in developing 
countries with investments and by helping U.S. companies relocate.91  Given the timeframe 
in which it was created, the BUILD Act is seen as the Trump Administration’s counter to 
the BRI.  By offering economic opportunity, Trump hopes to dissuade smaller nations from 
relying on China for their development goals.   
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A Hint of Bilateralism…and Minilateralism? 
 
U.S.-Japan 
 
 Despite criticizing the alliance earlier in his presidency, Trump reversed course and 
praised the U.S.-Japan relationship and called for its strengthening on its 60th anniversary.  
However, similarly to his criticism of other nations, Trump believes that Japan should be 
pulling more weight and not only convinced them to cover more costs of stationing U.S. 
troops but also suggested that Japan should acquire its own nuclear deterrence.  Perhaps 
more influential was Trump’s ability to help Abe rework Japan’s security agreement 
framework to balance out the defense alliance.  Before, if Japan were to be attacked, the 
United States was required to come to its defense in full force, but the same could not be 
said the other way around.  Now, if U.S. troops were to be attacked, say in the South China 
Sea, Japan must come to its defense.  In discussions with Prime Minister Abe, Trump 
encouraged Japan to indirectly bolster the U.S.-Japan alliance by building more robust 
bilateral security relationships with smaller Southeast Asian nations in a U.S.-like 
fashion.92   As one of the most militarily capable countries in the region, Trump was 
shocked to learn that Japan only spends half the amount (in percentage) of what other high-
income countries spend on defense buildup – 1 percent of GDP compared to an average 
2.4 percent GDP.93  While all these points come across as Trump’s unhappiness with 
Japan’s side of the alliance, they come from a good place.  When Abe visited the United 
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States, Trump assured the world that their alliance is the “cornerstone of peace and stability 
in the Pacific region,” an alliance that was “unwavering” and “unshakeable”.94  The two 
also came out of the meetings with a formal, written declaration that the islands in the East 
China Sea were protected under the U.S.-Japan security treaty.  This declaration may set a 
precedent for future U.S. views of the islands in the South China Sea. 
 
U.S.-South Korea 
 
 President Trump’s approach to South Korea should come as no surprise.  Despite 
calling South Korea the “linchpin” of his administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy, Trump 
criticized South Korea for allegedly “free-riding” and claimed that Washington gets 
“practically nothing compared to the cost” of the alliance.95  Like Washington’s other 
alliances, Trump is pushing for South Korea to share more of the burden and is doing so 
by circumventing the decades-old negotiation process and making “exorbitant” demands 
to tell Seoul it must double its annual contributions to the cause.96  South Korea currently 
pays about $1 billion to support the military bases in its territory, but Trump is looking for 
a five-fold increase.97  With these new contributions, Trump will look to add to the already 
30,000 U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula, right on China’s doorstep.  In confronting 
China, Trump and South Korean President Moon have a great weapon their disposal: the 
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wartime Operational Control (OPCON).  As the United States’ most tightly woven 
integrated command system in the world, OPCON is the crux of U.S.-South Korea burden-
sharing.  In the event of a war in the Peninsula, South Koreans would command Americans 
and vice versa.98  Through this security realm, Trump pushed South Korea to choose 
between its primary economic partner (China) and its security guarantor (USA).  The fact 
that South Korea should have to choose at all is a reason for Trump to address the economic 
tensions between the two nations.99  Upset with the U.S. goods deficit with South Korea, 
Trump initially threatened to remove the United States from the Korea-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement (KORUS FTA).  At one time, negotiations between Seoul and Washington 
seemed a long way off; however, an announcement from North Korea wanting to 
participate in the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics brought the two sides to the 
negotiation table.  The new 2018 KORUS FTA focused on reducing the U.S. trade deficit 
by reducing automobile safety standards on U.S. vehicles and reworking the South Korean 
importation process to address U.S. complaints regarding customs procedures and fair 
pricing and reimbursement on certain products.100 
 
U.S.-India 
 
 Similar to Japan, Trump’s view of India was initially unclear yet critical.  His 
predecessors viewed India as a long-term investment for the United States, but Trump’s 
much more transactional diplomacy originally worried Delhi as they were uncertain as to 
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what he might want them to put on the table.  However, after a year in office, the Trump-
Modi relationship showed great promise.  After welcoming Prime Minister Modi to 
Washington in 2017, Trump highlighted the importance of maintaining a strong partnership 
between the Indo-Pacific’s two “democratic stalwarts”.101  In his first two years, Trump 
greatly increased security and defense cooperation dialogues including, but not limited to, 
high-level exchanges, expansion of military exercises, and technology transfer.  
Interestingly, Trump granted India status as only the third country to receive Strategic 
Trade Authorization – Tier 1; a designation that eases regulations and licenses for high-
tech defense and aerospace exports.  Not wasting any time, the United States sold 72,000 
assault rifles, 24 anti-submarine helicopters, 24 Predator drones, and 111 Navy utility 
helicopters.102  Additionally, the United States and India use these exchanges to conduct 
military exercises and, like under Obama, continue at the rate of around fifty times per year.  
A new aspect came about in 2019 when Trump and Modi agreed to a “mega tri-service 
amphibious exercise” marking only the second time in its history that India has involved 
all three branches of its military in an exercise with a foreign country.103  Trump recognizes 
the importance of India’s status as a growing power to balance China’s growth.  His need 
for India is well exemplified by his willingness to capitulate certain matters such as 
granting India a six-month waiver from Iran oil sanctions.  As a man who prides himself 
on protecting American interests, his willingness to manage differences all but reveals the 
importance he believes India can play in stopping China.  Elsewhere in the world, Trump 
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made decisions that played to India’s interests in hopes that India would stand behind the 
United States in the South China Sea.  In Pakistan, Trump withdrew $300 million in aid 
under accusations that it was harboring terrorists; a move that was quite pleasing to Delhi.  
Finally, like with Japan, Trump wishes to extend nuclear deterrence.  In 2019 at the ninth 
India–U.S. Strategic Security Dialogue, the two nations’ leaders signed an agreement for 
U.S. firms to build six nuclear power plants in India and add an Indian representative to 
the U.S. Defense Innovation Unit Experimental that funds private companies that explore 
defense technologies.104 
 Despite making progress military, Trump’s discussions with India have worsened 
the economic relationship.  Early in his tenure, Trump hit India with a couple of punches: 
threatened sanctions on Indian companies importing oil from Iran, decision to impose 
tariffs on metal products from India, and threatened sanctions for “significant transactions” 
with Russia’s defense industry (India’s main military equipment supplier).  These trade 
frictions now make up the largest part of disagreements between the two countries, seeing 
India place retaliatory tariffs of up to seventy percent on nearly thirty U.S. products.  The 
United States also suffers from a significant trade deficit with India which resulted in 
Trump trying to work out a trade deal with Delhi.  However, no trade deal was successfully 
negotiated, and the United States revoked India’s Generalized System of Preference (GSP) 
status in 2019.  The GSP is designed to give duty-free market access to exports from 
developing countries and India is the largest beneficiary; this revocation painted 
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Washington in a very bad light in India’s eyes.  Overall, Trump’s vision of the U.S.-India 
alliance is dominated militarily while maintaining economic autarchy. 
 
The ‘Quad’ 
 
 Though the Quad is not his brainchild, Trump did not hesitate to dip his toe into 
this example of minilateralism.  Started originally as a group of responders to the 
devastating 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and earthquake, the Quad is a discussion between 
the United States, Australia, Japan, and India – the four biggest players in Asia (barring 
China).  Having collectively committed 40,000 troops and humanitarian workers to the 
affected region, Japanese Prime Minister Shinto Abe recognized a golden opportunity for 
these four large powers to come together and address all four of their biggest concerns – 
China.  Policy documents from the White House affirmed the United States’ full 
commitment to the Quad, with Trump signing The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act that 
outlines the country’s four interests in the Quad as being: promoting a rules-based order, 
respect for international law, and a free and open Indo-Pacific. 105   The best way of 
understanding the Quad’s efficacy might be to understand it as a network of bilateral and 
trilateral dialogues, of which there are six and three respectively.  For the United 
particularly, its boosting of military influence in Asia is helped along by Japan’s joining in 
the U.S.-Australia exercise “Talisman Saber” and the reestablishment of “2+2” defense 
dialogues with India.106  The most worrying aspect of the Quad for China is the number of 
exchanges underlying the Quad.  Today, these four countries experience unprecedented 
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levels of information, intelligence, military, and diplomatic exchanges.  As it aligns with 
his Asia policy position, Trump should be pleased with the amount of military engagement 
taking place within the Quad.  The Quad countries now conduct more joint military 
exercises and training than ever before; a sign of growing mutual trust and buying into 
similar interests between like-minded democratic partners.  The Quad’s greatest strength 
is the signal that it sends to Beijing. 
 The Quad appears to be Trump’s favorite vehicle in confronting China over the 
South China Sea, and he has made efforts over the past few years to increase its role.  In 
an important milestone, Trump publicly referenced the “Quad Initiative” during his speech 
alongside Indian President Modi; a rare leader-level endorsement of the four-way alliance 
that was mainly discussed between lower levels of governments.107  In his meeting with 
Modi, Trump explained that their talks covered the use of the Quad to expand cooperation 
on cybersecurity and maritime security to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific.  He also 
expressed his excitement to provide India with the world’s best military equipment and 
technology.  To continue boosting the Quad, Trump attended meetings with Japanese and 
Australian leaders to discuss participation in joint FONOPs, while also convincing Japan 
to purchase more American military equipment.  Furthermore, in his meeting with these 
leaders, Trump is insistent on impressing upon them that regional stability will not be 
possible without a regional power bloc.  However, Trump is surprisingly careful with how 
he goes about discussing the Quad as he knows these leaders want to stay in China’s good 
graces due to its huge economic influence.  In summation, Trump uses the Quad primarily 
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for military means, not a multilateral approach, to increase the size and frequency of 
military forces patrolling the region based out of democratic nations. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 While initially hinting at a serious retrenchment from Asia, Trump’s actual policies 
in practice ended up incorporating America’s allies more than anticipated, though not 
nearly to the same extent as Obama.  Whereas Obama opened up to Southeast Asia with a 
bear hug, Trump settled more for a tip of his hat.  Rather than total cooperation, Trump 
saw the benefits of drastically strengthening military, defense, and security partnerships in 
the region as a direct counter to China’s territorial claims.  Increasing physical displays of 
military prowess with the three largest powers in the region further signal to China the 
United States’ resolve on the issue. 
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The Rise of Xi Jinping 
 
 Understanding China’s ambitions to control the South China Sea and rise to the top 
of the metaphorical food chain is impossible without understanding the man calling all the 
shots: China’s President and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi 
Jinping.  The star of an underdog official’s burgeoning into the world’s most powerful man, 
Xi Jinping’s rise is nothing short of extraordinary.   
 
Humble Beginnings 
 
 Born in 1953, Xi Jinping grew up during incredibly tumultuous and uncertain times 
– circumstances that would serve to shape the strongman ruler he would later become.  All 
seemed well and good for Xi whose father was a member of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP).  However, everything changed for Xi when his father was purged from the party 
for allegedly supporting anti-Maoist propaganda.  Like many other ‘privileged’ urban 
youths at the time, Xi was sent to the rural countryside in Shaanxi province as part of the 
"Up to the Mountains and Down to the Countryside Movement" re-education campaign to 
learn the hardships of farmers.  The tough conditions of the countryside did not sit well 
with Xi, so he fled back to Beijing only to be imprisoned for six months.  Realizing that 
the countryside was the lesser of two evils, he fled again to the revolutionary base in Yan’an 
where he lived alone in a self-dug hillside cave. 
 These six years of living in poverty without the mentorship of a father forced Xi to 
become very independent, adaptable, and resilient.  By this time, the Cultural Revolution 
was winding down and the CCP’s ideology began to retake its shape.  According to one of 
his friends, Xi chose to become “redder than red” to survive – so began his political 
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campaign.  Before joining the CCP, it reportedly took Xi ten attempts before finally being 
accepted, likely due to his family background of a purged father.  After bouncing around 
for years at different levels of leadership around the country, he finally settled into his most 
formative role as party chief of Zhejiang Province.  While there, he saw strong economic 
growth that allowed him to win the support of political elites and high-ranking officials.  
Shortly after, he was unexpectedly named as the new Communist Party boss of Shanghai 
– China’s most prosperous city.  While in Shanghai, Xi kept a notoriously low profile so 
that no dirt could be dug up on him.  Given his very laidback leadership style while in 
Shanghai, it remains a mystery as to how he was eventually promoted to the nine-member 
Politburo Standing Committee, and then again to vice-president as the likely successor to 
Hu Jintao.  Many scholars attribute his success to being an opportunistic candidate taking 
advantage of presenting himself as a safe compromise between the two frontrunners Jiang 
Zemin and Hu Jintao who at the time were butting heads.108  As a man who laid in wait for 
so long, quietly buying his time, it should come as no surprise that there was an agenda 
brewing within him.109 
 
Setting the Stage for Strongman Rule 
 
 After nearly three decades of calamitous rule under Chairman Mao Zedong, China 
needed to move in a new direction both politically and economically to regain the trust of 
the people that was lost during the Mao years.  Since 1979, the successes of China’s 
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economic reforms have been unquestionable, putting them on track to become the world’s 
largest economy.  Where past Chinese presidents were more than ready to take chances in 
their domestic affairs, the international stage posed a significant issue: the United States.  
Until Xi was appointed as president in 2013, China was still incapable of putting up a 
strong challenge to U.S. hegemony.  For three decades, the Chinese political system was 
governed by a collective leadership with shared decision-making authority.  This system 
was very inefficient because blame could be assigned, responsibility for failures could be 
shared, and bargaining could take place within the committee.  In the era of Hu Jintao, 
active self-censorship efforts were made to not create misunderstanding and suspicion on 
the global stage.  In one speech, the first iteration mentioned China’s “peaceful rise” only 
to later be changed to “peaceful development”.110  Hu’s governing motto soon became 
clear in a 2008 speech where he revealed he ruled by the phrase – “don’t rock the boat”.111  
This philosophy was incredibly disappointing to Xi, who recognized the growing 
capabilities of China.  As the last standing major communist power, Xi was determined to 
flip the script on the United States to assert China as a global powerhouse.  He was about 
to take China from a risk-averse country to a risk-maximizing country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
110 Shen, Simon. “How Xi’s Bluntness Contrasts with Hu’s Risk Aversion.” ejinsight, January 
2015. 
111 Jiangtao, Shi. “President Hu Jintao’s Legacy Seen as One of Stability but Stagnation.” South 
China Morning Post, September 2012. 
 47 
Xi’s Power Grab, Agenda, and ‘Revolution’ 
 
“We will never relinquish our legitimate rights and interests or allow China's core 
interests to be undermined. We should firmly uphold China's territorial sovereignty, 
maritime rights and interests and national unity.” 
- Xi Jinping, November 2014 
 
Power Grab 
 
Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power is best described with words such as swift, 
stealthy, and cunning.  His first and most significant strategy was the launching of an 
enormous anti-corruption campaign dubbed “fighting tigers and flies”.  This campaign was 
essentially a large-scale purge that eliminated potential challengers to his authority, 
weakened other political factions, and to ensure top political posts would be filled in by his 
loyalists.  Victims of this massive anti-corruption campaign were present at every level of 
every branch of the government; from ex-Politburo members to military generals to 
corporation chairmen – nobody was safe.112  In just four years, the number of people 
disciplined by the CCP skyrocketed from 150,000 to 400,000.113  These numbers highlight 
not only the broad scope of Xi’s campaign but also its acceleration; a sign that Xi has no 
intention of giving up power any time soon. 
As a symbolic gesture of his intent, Xi went to Shenzhen to make one of his first 
public appearances in the same location of Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Southern Tour’ of the same 
nature.114  In the two short years following that trip, Xi already proposed sixty economic, 
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political, and social changes.115  Most notably, Xi a point to completely centralize authority 
by making himself the leader of all the most important committees, functionally becoming 
the ‘chairman of everything’.  At the 19th Party Congress, Xi further solidified his power 
by adding more allies and loyalists to the top governing parties while also codifying his 
ideology – “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” 
– in the CCP’s constitution; a privilege that had not occurred since Mao.  This CCP first 
since Mao is incredibly telling of Xi’s political philosophy.  In Mao’s China, the 
“penetration of society” was a defining feature of the state compared to Deng’s China that 
was noticeable for its withdrawal from that philosophy.  In Xi’s China, he is reverting to 
Maoist ways; no element of political, social, or economic life has remained untouched by 
his hand.  Now, with China’s growing economic clout, Xi appears set to take this Maoist 
philosophy to the international stage.116  Moving away from China’s traditional low-profile 
foreign policy, Xi seeks to shape international norms and institutions in pursuit of the 
“Chinese Dream,” which in Xi’s eyes, is the “rejuvenation of Chinese nation”.117  In a 
speech given in 2014, Xi told the world that China should be allowed to “construct 
international playgrounds” and “create the rules” of activities taking place there. 118  
China’s foreign policy today is the polar opposite of what it was just a decade ago.  At the 
core of Xi’s agenda is a clear nationalist revival with strong anti-West sentiments.  Xi 
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continues to sell China as a victim of Western modernization and uses the blame to gain 
domestic supporters who have experienced a great economic revival since Xi stepped into 
power.  The power and appeal of Xi’s rhetoric about rejuvenated China into a prosperous 
country with a powerful military should not be underestimated.  Faced with a population 
and officials that expect Beijing to stand up for itself, Xi likely feels compelled to push 
harder on many issues. 
 
An Ambitious Agenda 
 
As could be expected by his lack of noticeable actions leading up to his presidency, 
Xi began his term in office with a clear agenda.  This agenda covered three key aspects of 
Chinese resurgence: protecting national interests, peaceful development (with a catch), and 
creating an external environment that serves China domestically.  While protecting national 
interests is a core goal of any country, Xi made the bold assertion that peaceful 
development would not impede on Chinese national interests.  In a sense, Xi appeared to 
imply that China was unwilling to forego its national interests for the sake of peace.  In a 
speech given to the People’s Liberation Army, he called for the acceleration of military 
modernization and stated that China “long[s] for peace, but at any time and under any 
circumstances, [it] will not give up defending [its] legitimate national interests and rights, 
and will not sacrifice [its] core national interests”.119  This attitude is a significant step 
away from past ideas of ‘hiding and buying one’s time’ and it reveals Xi’s concern that a 
commitment to peaceful development will hinder China to take more questionable actions 
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to protect its interests.  The topic of this thesis covers the most clear-cut display of Xi’s 
new assertiveness: the South China Sea.  Secondly, Xi has new expectations of the 
international community.  In apparent swipes at the United States and other Western 
powers, Xi said that China can only commit to peaceful development if other countries 
reciprocate and commit to peace as well.  This move by Xi is taking China out of the 
backseat and putting it at the forefront of international rules creation.  Before Xi, ‘peaceful 
development’ was a way of reassuring other countries’ concerns about a rising China, but 
now Xi is essentially letting the world know that there is no stopping the train and they 
must play along to avoid any escalations.  Lastly, Xi implanted a new idea of “top-level 
design” in foreign policymaking to shape China’s external environments in a way that is 
beneficial domestically.  ‘Top-level design’ includes further centralization of planning and 
policymaking accompanied by greater coordination between all levels of government 
involved in China’s foreign relations.  Most related to the South China Sea conflict, Xi 
established the “Working Conference on Peripheral Diplomacy” in 2013 that gathered all 
members of the Politburo Standing Committee (and many other officials) to plan China’s 
peripheral diplomacy for the next decade that would involve strengthening ties with 
neighboring countries to create the aforementioned favorable external environment.  
Institutionally, Xi formed the National Security Commission to streamline national 
security strategy and coordination; he named himself as the head.  A product of “top-level 
design” is a ‘policy’ of an opposite name – “bottom-line thinking”.  In the administrations 
leading up to Xi, Chinese leaders always expressed their hopes for what other countries 
should do.  Now, under Xi, China’s “bottom-line” is essentially a red line that is 
straightforward in telling other countries what sort of actions Beijing will not tolerate.  At 
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the 2014 Boao Conference for Asia, Premier Li Keqiang addressed the South China Sea 
dispute by asserting that China will “respond firmly to provocations” by “repaying 
kindness with kindness and meeting wrongdoing with justice”.120 
 
‘Revolution’ 
 
With his agenda laid out, Xi Jinping’s subsequent actions can be viewed as a 
‘revolution’ against the international order and status quo.  As Napoleon once said, Xi 
recalled that “China is a sleeping lion” and the “world will shake [when she wakes]”.121  
Xi’s assertiveness on behalf of China is multi-faceted and difficult to nail down.  From 
high-profile endeavors like the Belt and Road Initiative and island-building in the South 
and East China Sea to intervention in humanitarian conflicts, China is becoming 
increasingly engaged on the world stage.  In 2013, Xi launched his incredibly ambitious 
Belt and Road Initiative that aimed to act as a modern revival of the Silk Road.  The breadth 
of this project is incredible, and the numbers are staggering – 900 projects with over 80 
percent contracted to Chinese firms, 76 ports and terminals in 34 countries, $90 billion of 
Chinese investments, and $6 trillion in trade.  Furthermore, quite ironically, all of Xi’s 
rhetoric about nationalism and sovereignty is contradicted by his foreign policy actions that 
see him consciously violate the latter.  In conjunction with increased engagement in the 
United Nations, China put up a ten-year, $1 billion Peace and Development Fund, 
established an 8,000-troop peacekeeping force, and increased involvement in humanitarian 
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operations.  While intervening in humanitarian crises is a reason for violating a country’s 
sovereignty, it is difficult to ignore the ulterior motive of China’s decision to get involved.  
Furthermore, not only has China begun to send peacekeeping forces to crisis hotspots like 
South Sudan, but China imposes its communist ideology long after the fighting is over by 
implementing training programs for the infant governments on the ways of Chinese ruling 
parties.122   Increased engagement on the peacekeeping front is becoming just another 
checkbox on the road to unseating the United States at the top of the world order.123 
 
Territorial Assertiveness – ‘South China Xi (Sea)’ 
 
 Given the large quantities of natural resources and trade routes in the South China 
Sea, it should come as no surprise that Xi is using his platform of unwillingness to 
capitulate on peace in order to protect China’s national interests.  Just days after Xi’s 
inauguration, the PLA Navy held an arms exercise and symbolic ceremony off the coasts 
of Malaysia and Brunei vowing to defend China’s sovereignty claims.  The following year, 
China acted on its own initiative and deployed an oil rig (HYSY-981) in the Paracel Islands 
and escorted it with one hundred ships and a handful of fighter jets.  This escort for one oil 
rig may seem excessive, and it is, but it emphasizes Beijing’s resolve in consolidating its 
irredentist claims.  This ‘above and beyond’ resolve is clear as Xi uses all resources at his 
disposal to make small gains that, in the long run, together will be a major strategic change 
for China.  By using resources ranging from military equipment down to civilian boats, Xi 
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is employing a ‘tough to crack’ territorial expansion tactic known as ‘salami-slicing’ and 
‘cabbage patch’.  ‘Salami-slicing’ the South China Sea involves reclaiming small portions 
of the disputed territory to minimize confrontations and, at the end, add up all the new 
pockets to unveil full claim the entire region.  However, protecting these new ‘slices’ is not 
easy to do without setting off rival militaries, so China employs its ‘cabbage patch’ 
technique – surrounding the recently claimed islands with multiple layers of civilian 
vessels to deter foreign militaries from launching an attack.124  Overall, Xi uses his close 
relationship with the military to realize his goals in the South China Sea; constant parades 
of ships, military exercises, and close calls with foreign vessels sum up his approach. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Xi Jinping’s rise to power from a common citizen to one of the world’s most 
powerful men is remarkable.  His uncanny ability to maneuver his way up the ranks of the 
CCP, purge corrupt officials, and surround himself with diehard loyalists built a platform 
from which he can act swiftly and unilaterally across the board.  Xi Jinping’s foreign policy 
strategy reflects China’s strong desire to rebuild its image after years of humiliation and 
turmoil and establish itself as the world’s largest power.  Before Xi, Chinese leaders were 
too cautious of the West’s abilities and opted to tone down their foreign policy initiatives 
so as not to raise alarms in the United States.  Now, with one of the world’s most powerful 
militaries and a strong economy behind him, Xi is beginning to step on more toes because 
there is little another country can do to stop China without in turn harming itself.125  Xi’s 
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strategy of incremental gains in the South China Sea reveals a carefully calculated plan that 
avoids escalating to a situation requiring forceful U.S. action while also taking advantage 
of the smaller nations incapable of putting up a fight. 
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Conclusion – Evaluating the Strategies 
 
Obama 
 
 When Obama announced his administration’s “pivot to Asia” foreign policy, he 
sought to expand American presence within the Asia-Pacific by forging closer military, 
trade, and diplomatic ties with various states across the region.  He recognized the future 
of the world would likely be centered in the region, so he looked to invest the United States 
in the “Asian century”.126  Having concluded his time in office, we have the benefit of 
hindsight to assess his strategies and evaluate their effectiveness in countering Beijing’s 
muscular foreign policy.  Concerning the South China Sea, this section will evaluate 
Obama’s strategy across two dimensions – military and economic – as they are the two 
most pertinent factors driving the outcome of that specific conflict. 
 
Military 
 
 In this realm, the main focus of Obama’s rebalancing strategy was to build stronger 
alliances and relationships with Southeast Asian countries to boost both the United States’ 
and Southeast Asia’s military presence in the region to act as a counterweight to China’s 
increased assertiveness.  To accomplish this goal, Obama looked to enhance existing 
military agreements with established powers – Australia, Japan, South Korea – while also 
building new ties with emerging powers such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines.  
Additionally, the Department of Defense pledged $425 million to boost Southeast Asian 
countries’ maritime surveillance capabilities through the Maritime Security Initiative.  
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Lastly, Obama continued joint military exercises with countries in the region to prepare for 
escalation and to demonstrate American resolve.127 
 Despite these accomplishments, Obama’s strategy only come up with mixed results.  
In terms of the United States’ bilateral security alliances, his objective was only partially 
achieved.  While he was able to update long-standing alliances, he missed out on forging 
new alliances, particularly with the two largest democratic nations in the region, India, and 
Indonesia.  Concerning the emerging powers, the Obama administration set out to use these 
smaller nations as tools to push Beijing to participate in the global rules-based order.  An 
ambitious strategy, corralling the emerging powers to bandwagon behind the United States 
did not prove as effective as Obama would have hoped.  After a long-winded international 
tribunal in the Hague, President Duterte of the Philippines expressed that he was willing to 
“set aside” the arbitral decision in pursuit of strengthening his relationship with Beijing, 
whom he sees as the future ‘victor’ in the Sino-U.S. standoff for hegemony.  Similarly, 
Vietnam and Malaysia began downplaying their conflicting territorial claims with China 
after realizing the economic benefits that accompany a tighter relationship with Beijing.  
Furthermore, Obama looked to use these nations to push for more transparency from 
Beijing to follow his lead and curtail its military spending.  However, under Obama, the 
U.S. Department of Defense budget rose from $534 billion in 2010 and $585 billion in 
2015, an increase of 9%, but was expected to remain flat into 2020.  China, meanwhile, 
saw its defense spending increase from $134 billion to $190 billion in the same five-year 
period and expected it to increase to $260 billion by 2020, an increase of nearly 30% and 
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50% respectively.  Moreover, the money was being flooded into the South China Sea.  
Beijing continued to order the construction of islands throughout Obama’s tenure, but at 
the end of his presidency announced that it would stop.  While the island-building came to 
an end, the construction of military facilities on the artificial islands continued seemingly 
unchallenged.128  Lastly, the overall strategy of focusing a majority of U.S. military might 
in the Asia-Pacific only serves to put China on high-alert and give it a reason to accelerate 
its military mobilization and modernization.129 
 
Economy 
 
 On this front, Obama looked set to make some headway in containing China.  His 
preferred method for tackling China’s huge economy was by working through and 
strengthening multilateral institutions such as ASEAN.  While he was able to elevate 
American prestige within these institutions by building rapport with different leaders, the 
increased engagement did little to leverage the institutions to add pressure on China to 
abide by global rules and norms.  Going beyond diplomatic pressure, the hope was that by 
engaging other leaders, the United States could convince them to come under its economic 
umbrella, not China’s.  To accomplish this goal, Obama proposed his promising Trans-
Pacific Partnership that would involve nearly half the world’s global trade and position the 
United States as the world’s outright dominant economy.  However, the exclusion of China 
from this unprecedented trade deal encouraged Beijing to pursue and advance its own 
economic programs like the Belt and Road Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure 
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Investment Bank.  The expansion of these projects around the world and the growing 
dependence of other countries on Chinese investments highlights the TPP having the 
opposite effect, instead motivating China to continue expanding to gain an upper hand. 
 Overall, the Obama administration was not very effective in containing China, nor 
was it successful in stopping its advances in the South China Sea.  Although Obama’s 
approach caused a few headaches for Beijing, his policies did not significantly worsen the 
external environment that Xi Jinping sought to preserve.  Additionally, smaller countries 
having to pick sides only has short-term effects and they realize that they benefit most from 
taking a stance right between the two.  Lastly, the effectiveness of Obama’s China strategy 
can be evaluated from a domestic opinion perspective.  The fact that Donald Trump, the 
polar opposite of Obama, won the next presidential election is a clear sign of public 
discontent with Obama’s China policy, among other factors.130 
 
Trump 
 
 Throughout his presidential campaign and into his time in office, Trump long 
criticized the former administration’s attitude towards China as being too timid and 
insufficiently robust.  In Trump’s eyes, the former way of conducting business through a 
bilateral relationship favored China and put the United States at a disadvantage for attaining 
global leadership.  Looking to take the country in a new direction, Trump adopted a ‘zero-
sum’-ish, ‘America first’ approach.  Off the bat, Trump’s strategy to push back against 
China’s expansion lacks the same coherence that Obama’s had.  However, Trump’s 
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strategy is an example of there being a ‘method to the madness’.  Despite placing trade 
barriers and increasing military buildup in the region, it is unclear what the Trump 
administration’s real objectives are – alter Chinese behavior on specific issues, decouple 
the two economies, or obstruct China’s rise?  Similar to the last section, this section will 
evaluate Trump’s approach across the military and economic dimensions. 
 
Military 
 
 Donald Trump fully buys into the idea of American military superiority, and his 
dealings with China on that matter are no exception.  To challenge China, Trump aimed to 
not only dramatically increase U.S. military presence in the region, but also build strong 
bilateral military agreements with the region’s major powers to motivate them to increase 
their presence as well.  In his first year in office, Trump spent double the amount of money 
that Obama did in his last year towards security assurances to Southeast Asian states.  The 
Trump administration also noticeably increased the size and frequency of its Freedom of 
Navigation Operations near the contested islands to signal a hardline approach to Beijing; 
America’s military was ready at a moment’s notice.  Concerning increased engagement 
from other nations, Trump looked to the Quad – a strategic alliance of the region’s biggest 
powers – for support.  Now, these powerful nations conduct more joint military exercises 
than ever before; a sign of trust and working towards a common goal of containing China. 
 Despite Trump’s seemingly erratic decisions, he has been successful in maintaining 
robust security relationships with traditional U.S. allies.  The United States and its allies 
continue to increase the frequency and size of their military exercises, and Japan is set to 
become the largest non-U.S. buyer of the newest line of U.S. fighter jets.  In the South 
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China Sea, China has stopped its island-building altogether and its construction of facilities 
on those islands, while not stopped, has slowed – all that changed when the coronavirus 
pandemic swept across the globe.  In what appears to be an attempt to capitalize on a 
distracted world with reduced capabilities, Beijing restarted its activities in the South China 
Sea.  Despite American efforts urging China to focus on supporting pandemic relief, China 
seems set on accomplishing its long-term strategic goals.  Though its resources are stretch 
thin, the United States continues to show off its military in the region, but to little avail.131 
 
Economy 
 
 Trump’s economic pushback against China is highlighted by the U.S.-China trade 
war.  Trump’s imposition of punitive tariffs on China is aimed at decoupling it from the 
global economy and forcing U.S. companies to look elsewhere to establish their supply 
chains, ultimately crippling the Chinese economy.  The second major economic change 
under the Trump administration was the withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 
hopes of incentivizing Southeast Asian nations to diversify, to look for their own ways, to 
have conversations and negotiations in which [the U.S.] will not be participants”.132 
 So just how effective were Trump’s economic policies towards China’s rise?  At 
first, he got off to a rocky start by withdrawing the United States from the TPP, as being 
party to it would have reduced tariff and nontariff barriers to U.S. exports in Asia.  It also 
offered smaller Southeast Asian nations trade alternatives to their dependence on China.  
Unwilling to limit themselves to Asian nations, U.S. manufacturers are looking elsewhere 
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to diversify their supply chains.  While this diversification is not without its costs, it is an 
investment that in the long-run will make the global economy more competitive and 
resilient. 133   This withdrawal occurred without much explanation, but the Trump 
administration soon released statements that provided strong reasonings, such as China’s 
use of “economic inducements and penalties,” “implied military threats to persuade other 
states” to heed its agenda,” and “predatory economics”.134   About the trade war, the 
hardline approach of imposing steep tariffs startled Beijing.  After many tit-for-tat 
responses from Beijing and Washington, it is clear that Trump has succeeded in pressing 
China as they signed ‘Phase 1’ of a U.S.-China trade deal that will hopefully halt economic 
malpractices.  The deal also commits China to crack down on theft of American intellectual 
property, increase spending to close the trade deficit, and avoid currency manipulation.  
Should the agreement hold and evolve into the next phase, the United States will be in a 
much less compromising position.135 
 
Xi 
 When compared to Obama and Trump, Xi’s policies of assertiveness in the South 
China Sea appear to be the most effective of the three.  Of course, effectiveness and success 
are in the eye of the beholder, but placing oneself in the shoes of all three leaders will lead 
to the understanding that China is ‘winning’ the contest.  Keeping consistent, this section 
will evaluate Xi’s military and economic approaches. 
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Military  
 
 In this domain, China has an outright more effective strategy.  Without having to 
bear the burden of being the world’s police and protector of right and wrong, China is 
perfectly content with challenging international rule of law.  By taking advantage of its 
situation, Xi used China’s military to capture the disputed territories without any real risk 
of conflict with the United States.  By acting swiftly, China has fully established itself in 
the region by surrounding the islands with layers of military vessels and by constructing 
Chinese military facilities on them, too.  Now, there is no real way that foreign countries 
can attempt to reclaim those islands without escalating to armed conflict.  Furthermore, 
whenever China develops new military technology, it makes sure to parade the new ships 
and planes in the South China Sea to highlight where its focus is. 
 
Economy 
 
 While the trade war certainly hurt China, it will eventually bounce back in the long-
run and come out in better shape than the United States.  With so much of the world’s 
supply chain located in China, Xi’s decision to create the Belt and Road Initiative to 
outsource Chinese production to other countries serves to increase countries’ dependence 
on China for their economic survival.  Furthermore, the sheer number of new initiatives 
that Xi puts out makes it very difficult for the United States to put together a comprehensive 
response.  Xi’s willingness to forego short-term economic interests in favor of long-term 
strategic goals also makes his strategy difficult to nail down. 
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Closing Remarks and the Future 
 
 At the end of the day, both administrations had mixed results in tackling the 
daunting rise of China.  The Chinese Communist Party, and its leader Xi Jinping, is a 
formidable beast capable of rapidly adapting to the tactics that the United States employs 
against it.  It is often forgotten that China has been a civilization far longer than the United 
States and they have had to endure centuries of both hardship and prosperity.  When it 
comes down to it, neither Obama nor Trump was markedly successful in stopping China’s 
expansion, although it would seem Trump’s incoherent strategy reaped more benefits than 
Obama’s ‘grand strategy’.  Whereas Obama, and administrations before him, attempted to 
reshape China into a responsible global actor, Trump realizes that changing the state’s 
behavior is likely an impossible task and simply deals with China for who it truly is.  While 
not the most experienced president, his decision to ramp up military activity and engage in 
a trade war certainly hurt China, so when it comes to U.S.-China relations Trump may 
actually be the most effective in the last few decades.  The United States’ inability to tackle 
China may be more of an institutional and structural issue, as our democratic nation cannot 
act on a whim nor without domestic consent when facing China.  Furthermore, as the 
world’s largest economy, the United States is far too intertwined with many markets to risk 
damaging those relationships beyond repair by escalating conflict with Beijing.  As 
pessimistic as this outlook may be, it is difficult to envision a scenario in the future where 
the United States can emerge on top without resorting to armed conflict.  Slowly but surely, 
China appears set to ‘salami slice’ and take full control of the South China Sea.136 
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